

The Political Use of Ἐλευθερία and Ἀὐτονομία in the Fourth Century among the Greek City-States

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In a recent article I made an attempt to explore the origins of the concepts ἔλευθερία καὶ αὐτονομία as well as the reasons which may account for their emergence in the fifth century B.C. (1). In this paper I would like to continue the examination of the use of these two terms in the fourth century B.C. in order to ascertain whether they continue to convey the same meaning.

I

The Uses of ἔλευθερία

One need not belabor the point that the Spartans used the issue of liberty as a *cause célèbre* for their going to war against Athens. Liberty was the most potent issue which provided the moral justification the Peloponnesian camp needed to show the justice of its motives. Naturally, many Greeks suspected the sincerity of the Spartan pronouncements. Isocrates, whose objectivity is in turn in itself suspect, complained that the Spartans had reached such a pitch of greediness that they were not satis-

(1) *Revue Internationale des Droits de l'Antiquité*, 29 (1982) 145-162.

fied with their supremacy on land but desired to obtain supremacy on sea as well by inciting the Athenian allies to revolt, promising to liberate them (ἐλευθερώσειν αὐτοὺς ὑπισχνόμενοι, 12,103). The use of freedom as a motive for going to war heightened the expectations of the Greeks — especially those Greeks who wished to free themselves from the Athenian subjection — on the one hand, while on the other it made the use of the term problematic inasmuch as it became progressively difficult for many Greeks to know when or to what degree the Spartan would-be liberators were sincere in these declarations. As it frequently happens in such cases, this apparent dichotomy between Spartan pronouncements and Greek expectations led to misunderstandings and complications after the final Spartan objective was achieved, i.e. the defeat of Athens. Not long after the Spartan victory, complaints arose against Sparta regarding the violation of exactly that principle for which allegedly the Spartans had gone to war against the Athenians. These charges reveal both the sensitivity of the Greeks regarding their freedom and the customary predicament of the victor. Once again the dictum that war is easier to win than peace became evident. In truth, the architect of the Spartan victory at Aegospotamoi had very little regard for Greek sensitivity to freedom⁽²⁾. Harmosts and garrisons were imposed throughout the Greek city-states which were often viewed as tools of Spartan imperialism⁽³⁾. The presence of some of these harmosts and garrisons

(2) U. KAHRSTEDT, *Lysandros*, RE 13 (1927) 2503-06; H.W. PARKE, JHS 50 (1930) 37-79; H. SCHAEFER, *Alkibiades und Lysander in Ionien*, Würzburger Jahrbücher 4, 1949/50, 287-306; D. LOTZE, *Lysander und der Peloponnesischer Krieg*, Abh. d. Sächs. Akad. d. Wiss. zu Leipzig 57, 1962; BOMMELAIR, J.F., *Lysandre de Sparte* (Paris, 1981) 25 ff.

(3) The first known examples of harmosts are to be traced in the expedition of Brasidas. PARKE, JHS 50, 38 mentions also the archon in Trachinian Heracleia (Thuc. 5.21.2-52.1) whom Xenophon described as harmost (Hell. 1.2.18). In the cities of the Chalcidice which went over to Brasidas we have Polydamas in Mende, Thuc. 4.123; 4.129.3; 130.3; Pasitelidas in Torone, Thuc. 4.132.3; 5.3.1-2; Clearidas in Amphipolis, Thuc. 4.132.3; 5.6.5-11. When the Ionian cities began to secede, after Athens' defeat in Sicily, Sparta secured the secession of these cities through the imposition of harmosts and garrisons. Chios was under

could on occasion be justified as having been requested by the local governments as security against internal disorder or external attack (Xen. *Hell.* 2.3.13). Nonetheless, the imposition of governors and garrisons became an obvious symbol of foreign domination. The general attitude to garrisons at the beginning of the fourth century is best illustrated by the promise of Pharnabazus and Conon to the Aegean cities that they would not fortify the citadels of these cities and that they would leave them autonomous.

Following the collapse of Athens, there ensued a general overthrow of democratic regimes accompanied sometimes by the ruthless massacre of democrats⁽⁴⁾. The Spartans levied assessments to maintain their fleet, and as a result questions were soon asked as to whether the Spartans were an improvement over the Athenians or indeed whether several of the city-states liberated by Sparta had not been better off under the Athenians. Instead of freedom, the allies maintained, the Spartans proceeded to reduce to slavery those they had promised to free (ἐλευθερώσειν ὄμοσαν, κατεδουλώσαντο); this, at least, was the predominant Greek perception about the Spartan *hegemonia*. Among those who grumbled the loudest were the Thebans, Sparta's former allies. In 395 they accused the Lacedaemonians of having committed the crime of appointing helots as governors of free men while they themselves behaved as masters toward their allies, even though the latter were free people⁽⁵⁾.

Chalcideus, Thuc. 8.8.2; Pedaritus in Erythrae, Thuc. 8.28.5; Theopomp. *FGrHist* 115 F 8; Leon, Thuc. 8.61.2; Lesbos, Alkamenes, Thuc. 8.5.2, though at first it was Eteonicus, Thuc. 8.23.4; Miletus, Philip, Thuc. 8.28.5; Abydus, Dercylidas, Thuc. 8.61.1; Xen. *Hell.* 3.1.81; 3.5.13; Isocr. 4.110; G. BOCKISCH, *Klio, Beiträge zur Alten Geschichte* 46 (1965) 179-180. Not all of the cities, however, had harmosts and garrisons, LOTZE, *Lys.* 67.

(4) Xen. *Hell.* 1.1.2; Corn. Nepos *Lys.* 6.2.1-13; Diod. 13.104.5. For the role of Lysander, Polyaeus 1.45.1; V. EHRENBERG, *RE* 2, VI. Halbbd. (1929) 1400 s.v. Sparta; LOTZE, *Lys.* 28-29; F. KIECHLE, *Historia* (1958) 142; Xen. *Hell.* 2.1.15; Diod. 13.104.7.

(5) Xen. *Hell.* 3.5.12: ἐλευθέρων ὄντων and 3.5.13: ἀπὸ γὰρ ἐλευθερίας διπλὴν αὐτοῖς δουλείαν παρεστήκασιν· ὑπὸ τε γὰρ τῶν ἀρμοστῶν τυραννοῦνται καὶ ὑπὸ δέκα ἀνδρῶν.

Plut. *Lys.* 27.4; Justin 5.10.12 ff. Diod. 14.10.2; H.W. PARKE, *JHS* 50

Naturally, the most renowned case of post-Peloponnesian War Spartan policy was that of Athens. The tyrannical regime set up there by Lysander perpetrated myriad of atrocities against Athenian citizens and metics⁽⁶⁾. All notion of Freedom was banished, but at the end this regime became so hated that even the Spartans, who had originally supported it, felt little compunction about its demise. The short interlude of the Thirties became a watershed in Athenian history with significant connotations for the future internal and external developments of the city, especially relating to the issue of freedom. Had the Thirty expertly blended respect for authority with respect for citizens' rights, among which freedom was the most sacred, they might have succeeded in establishing a conservative constitution. Instead, in the internal conflict that ensued citizen participation against the tyrants was viewed as a badge of honor; neutrality became suspect. Philon is derided as an unworthy individual because he did nothing to help in the liberation of the state from the tyrants⁽⁷⁾. In the speech on the scrutiny of Evandros, Lysias' animosity is masked under his general appeal to the popular feeling against men of oligarchic sympathies who identified with the Thirty. While Evandros and his supporters had supposedly expelled citizens like the judges from the city, the democrats, in their respect for freedom, had allowed even the culprits to participate in the benefits of freedom when the city got rid of the tyrants. Referring to the events that followed Aegospotamoi,

(1930) 50; Ed. MEYER, *GdA*, 5.5 ff; A. ANDREWES, *Phoenix* 25 (1971) 206; Ch. D. HAMILTON, *Sparta's Bitter Victories* (London, 1979) 56; P. FUNKE, *Homonoia und Arche...*, *Historia Einzelschriften*, Heft 37 (1980) 27. Also, C.D. HAMILTON, *AJPh* 91 (1970) 294; U. KAHRSTEDT, *Lysandros*, *RF* 13,2 (1927) 2505-07.

(6) Xen. *Hell.* 2.3.2-11; 2.3.43; 2.4.2; Diod. 13.3.7; Isocr. 7.64; Xen. *Mem.* 1.2.21-25; *Ath. Pol.* 37; Lys. 12.94; Ditt. *Syll.* 1³ 165, No. 120; Tod 2,100. For the overthrow of the Thirty, Xen. *Hell.* 2.4.28; 2.29-39; 3.5.5; Lys. 12.58,60; *Ath. Pol.* 38; Diod. 14.33.5; Paus. 5.1-3; Plut. *Lys.* 21; Aisch. 3.190; Paus. 3.5.2; G. GROSSMANN, *Politische Schlagwörter aus der Zeit des Pelop. Krieges* (Arno reprint 1973) 23 nt. 59.

(7) Lys. 31.31. The emphasis is here on internal matters though allusion to external occupation is not necessarily excluded, ἢ πῶς ἂν χρηστόν τι βουλευῆσαι περὶ τῆς πολιτείας, ὃς οὐδὲ ἐλευθερῶσαι τὴν πατρίδα ἐβουλήθη;

Lysias denounced the incorrigible conduct of certain individuals in Athens and accused them of jealousy toward those who wanted to increase the city's greatness and freedom⁽⁸⁾. Lysias' wrath turned to pride, however, when he urged all the Greeks to put aside their internecine squabbles and, imitating* the feats of their fathers, to free themselves from their internal tyrannies⁽⁹⁾.

Similar sentiments about the Thirty and the liberation of Athens are to be found in Isocrates and in some of the official documents dealing with the period⁽¹⁰⁾. For example, an Athenian decree honored Euclis for his prompt services on behalf of Athenian freedom. Unfortunately, the inscription is not complete, but, if τῆγ καθ[οδον τοῦ δήμου τοῦ Ἀθην]αίων is the correct reading of the text, then the ἐλευθερί[αν] that follows must allude to the overthrow of the tyrants subsequent to the battles at Phyle and Piraeus⁽¹¹⁾. Although all of the above citations seem to advert to the internal tyranny at Athens, i.e. freedom from the oppressive regime of the Thirties, rather than the Thirties as the tool of the Spartans, they do not necessarily exclude external coercion.

If Sparta was the victor in the Peloponnesian War, this was due partly to the material assistance Sparta received from the Persians; but that assistance had been procured at the expense of the freedom of the Ionian Greeks, who thus became the sacrificial victims of the war. Nonetheless, as long as Cyrus the Younger was alive the Greeks in Ionia fared well inasmuch as Cyrus' ulterior purpose was to overthrow his brother, and for this reason he had to solicit the aid of the Greeks. After the disastrous outcome of Cyrus' campaign, Artaxerxes appointed Tissaphernes the overall governor of Asia Minor. But the Greek

(8) Lys. 26.2: ὑμεῖς δ' ἐλευθέραν αὐτὴν ποιήσαντες οὐ μόνον τῆς ἐλευθερίας ... μετέδοτε.

(9) Lys. 33.6: τοὺς δὲ τυράννους ἐξελάσαντες κοινὴν ἅπασιν τὴν ἐλευθερίαν κατέστησαν. And Lys. 34.32: μεγάλην καὶ ἐλευθέραν; 28.14: ὡς μεγάλην καὶ ἐλευθέραν τὴν πόλιν.

(10) Isocr. *Areop.* 65: ἐπειδὴ δ' οἱ φεύγοντες κατελθόντες πολεμεῖν ὑπὲρ τῆς ἐλευθερίας ἐτόλμησαν.

(11) IG II² No. 145.

cities would not admit Tissaphernes because they wished to be free⁽¹²⁾. They had earlier supported Cyrus and were now afraid of Tissaphernes' punishment. They therefore sent ambassadors to Sparta asking for her protection. Sparta responded with the dispatch of some troops first commanded by Thibron, then by Dercylidas. In 399 Dercylidas sent a message to the Aeolian cities exhorting them to free themselves from the garrisons of Mania (a stooge of the Persians) and her patron Pharnabazus⁽¹³⁾. Dercylidas further invited Mania's son-in-law to a conference whose purpose was to discuss the freedom of the Aeolian cities. Meidias hesitated at first, but, having taken hostages as security, he consented to meet with Dercylidas. At the meeting Dercylidas promised him an alliance, provided that Meidias would agree to leave his citizens free and independent⁽¹⁴⁾. Xenophon does not spell out in detail what the locution ἐλευθέρους καὶ αὐτονόμους means, but there is no doubt that what Xenophon alludes to at this point is external freedom as well as the citizens' right to frame their own laws. In this respect the use of both terms is consistent with the fifth century use of the terms. However, the juxtaposition of both terms is very interesting because, as it will be seen further on, it presages a trend characteristic of the fourth century.

Not too many years after these events, Agesilaus also went to Asia Minor to liberate the Greeks from Persian subjugation. The results of his campaign were not very spectacular but, while there, Agesilaus had a talk with Pharnabazus whom he urged to rebel against the King and make himself free, for being free was worth as much as all possessions on earth⁽¹⁵⁾. The meaning of ἐλεύθερος is dual here since Pharnabazus would not only be making himself free from the compulsions of Persian rule but

(12) Xen. *Hell.* 3.1.13: ἐλεύθεροι βουλόμενοι εἶναι.

(13) Xen. *Hell.* 3.1.16: ἐλευθεροῦσθαί τε αὐτάς; R.E. SMITH, *Historia* 2 (1953/54) 274-88.

(14) Xen. *Hell.* 3.1.20: ἐφ' ὧτε τοὺς πολίτας ἐλευθέρους τε καὶ αὐτονόμους ἔαν; Polyaeus, 2.6; G.E. UNDERHILL (ed.), *Xenophon Hellenica*, Arno Press reprint (New York, 1979) 87.

(15) Xen. *Hell.* 4.1.35: ἐλευθερον εἶναι ... ἀντάξιον εἶναι τῶν πάντων χρημάτων.

would also be ruling as an independent ruler whatever territories in Asia Minor he could detach for himself. On the other hand, since the Greeks considered the Persians slaves of the King's whims and not free in the sense that the Greeks understood freedom, Pharnabazus would be a free man as well as a free ruler (about the meaning of free man later).

Pharnabazus did not heed Agesilaus' advice and soon after this exchange, with the aid of the Athenian Conon, was able to turn the tables on the Spartans. Having defeated the Lacedaemonians at Cnidus, Pharnabazus and Conon drove out the Lacedaemonian governors from the islands of the Aegean. Some Greeks portrayed this victory as the burial place of Greek freedom because, as a price for the victory, Asia Minor was left to the barbarians⁽¹⁶⁾.

The victory of Conon had another result: it encouraged the Greeks — if the Greeks needed encouragement! — to intensify their internal fighting. In the war that broke out, the erstwhile rivals Corinth and Athens were now pitted against Sparta. In his eulogy of the Athenians who fell in the Corinthian War, Lysias emphasized the diplomatic revolution that had brought Corinth and Athens together, stating at the same time that the Athenians who died gave their lives for the freedom of their former foes⁽¹⁷⁾. By the use of freedom here Lysias adverts to external freedom, that is, freedom from Spartan domination.

The defence of Greek allies and the preservation of freedom from outside aggression became a *topos* in the writings of the fifth and fourth century authors. Seeking to inspire the Ten Thousand with confidence, Xenophon pointed to the victory of the Greeks over Xerxes and the consequent freedom of the Greek cities from external domination⁽¹⁸⁾. The Athenians were justifiably proud of their contribution to the cause of freedom in

(16) Lys. 2.60: ὡς συγκαθαπτομένοις τῆς αὐτῶν ἐλευθερίας τῇ τούτων ἀρετῇ.

(17) Lys. 2.68: ὑπὲρ τῆς τῶν πολεμίων ἐλευθερίας ἀποθνήσκειν. Xen. *Hell.* 3.5.5; Plut. *Lys.* 27; E. MEYER, *Theop. Hellenika* (Halle, 1909) *passim*; J. WALZ, *Philologus*, Suppl. 4 (1939) 51; Plat. *Menex.* 239D-245A.

(18) Xen. *Anab.* 3.2.13: μέγιστον δὲ μαρτύριον ἡ ἐλευθερία τῶν πόλεων.

the Persian Wars and never tired of reminding themselves and the other Greeks of that contribution. Similarly, in advocating peace with Sparta after the Corinthian War, Andocides cited examples from the Persian Wars⁽¹⁹⁾. Almost all of the fourth century Athenian orators touched upon this subject⁽²⁰⁾, while others, like Isocrates, went a step further in promoting the discontinuation of the fratricidal warfare and the initiation of a campaign against Persia⁽²¹⁾.

Isocrates' advice was not followed and the Greeks continued to exhaust their energies on fratricidal quarrels. One such quarrel existed between Thebes and Plataea. Forever claiming the hegemony of Boeotia, the Thebans compelled the restored Plataeans in 377-76 to join the Boeotian confederacy. The Plataeans disliked the idea and appealed to their perennial allies, the Athenians, to whom they offered their territory (Diod. 15.46). In 371 (though the date may not be entirely accurate) the Thebans surprised the Plataeans, destroyed their town, and annexed their territory. As in 427, the surviving Plataeans sought refuge at Athens where they continued to urge the Athenians to deliver Plataea. In so doing, the Plataeans recounted their earlier role in the battle of Plataea (in 479) which had been fought to secure the freedom of the Thebans and the other Greeks from the invaders⁽²²⁾. The Plataeans further asserted that the Athenians had always fought and were currently fighting for their freedom, for the freedom of their allies, and for the freedom of all those who had been deprived of their autonomy in violation of the oaths and covenants⁽²³⁾.

(19) Andoc. 3.5: καὶ τοὺς βαρβάρους καταναυμαχῆσαντες ἠλευθέρωσαμεν τοὺς Ἕλληνας, 1.107: μαχεσάμενοι τε ἐνίκων, καὶ τὴν τε Ἑλλάδα ἠλευθέρωσαν καὶ τὴν πατρίδα ἔσωσαν.

(20) Lys. 2.33; 2.44; 2.47; 2.55; 34.11; Isocr. 4.52; 95; 183; 12.93.

(21) Isocr. 4.195; 5.123; 139.

(22) Isocr. 12.61: ἡμᾶς ... τοὺς ὑπὲρ τῆς ἐλευθερίας συναγωνισαμένους; 12.60: τοῦτους (the Thebans) καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἅπαντας Ἕλληνας ἠλευθέρωσαν, the battle of 479. G. MATHIEU, *Les Idées politiques d'Isocrate* (Paris, 1925) 94; W. TAEGER, *Demosthenes* (Cambridge, 1938) passim.

(23) Isocr. 14.17: οὐδ' ὑπὲρ τῆς τῶν συμμάχων ἐλευθερίας ... ἀλλ' ὑπὲρ τῆς τῶν παρὰ τοὺς ὄρκους καὶ τὰς συνθήκας τῆς αὐτονομίας ἀποστερουμένων. The reference to war and allies relates to the Second Athenian League.

When in the 350s Philip began to occupy one after another the Greek cities, Demosthenes and others stressed the obligation of Athens to fight against him. All of the speakers were purportedly concerned with the preservation of Greek freedom⁽²⁴⁾. Consequently, they described those who fell fighting at Chaeronea as the defenders of Greek liberty⁽²⁵⁾. Generally speaking, the prevalent view among the Greeks was that those who cared for their cities and their advancement kept their cities free while selfish people usually contributed nothing to their city's greatness⁽²⁶⁾.

It is well known that during the wars of the successors of Alexander many Greek cities changed sides and, although their political situation did not always improve with the switch, several of the cities availed themselves of the change in order to express their gratitude to the persons instrumental in their purported redemption from the "hated" masters. Thus, Athens decreed honors to Timosthenes who had worked in favor of the Athenian *demos* in the war against Antipater⁽²⁷⁾. Similar honors were bestowed upon an unknown person of whose name only the last part is legible⁽²⁸⁾. The Sicyonian Euphron had offered his services in defense of Athenian freedom before and after the Lamian War and had been responsible for making the Sicyonians allies of the Athenians. The grateful Athenian *demos* decreed special honors for him⁽²⁹⁾. Finally, in 303-02 the Athenians decreed honors for the Larisean Meidias, a follower of Antigonos Monophthalmus, who had let a fleet squadron of Phoenicians and Athenians at the battle of Salamis in 307-06 (Diod. 20.50.3)

(24) Dem. 9.70: ἡμῖν γ' ὑπὲρ τῆς ἐλευθερίας ἀγωνιστέον.

(25) *Lys. Against Leocr.* 48: ὑπὲρ τῆς ἐλευθερίας ἀμύνοντες.

(26) *Andoc.* 4.1: μεγάλαι καὶ ἐλεύθεραι γίνονται.

(27) IG II² No. 467, ca. 306/05: καὶ πρότερόν τε ἐ[ν τῷ πολέμῳ ὄν πεπολέμηκε]ν ὁ δῆμος ὁ Ἀθηναίων [πρὸς Ἀντίπατρον ὑπὲρ τῆς ἐλ]ευθερίας τῶν [Ἑ]λλή[νων]. Timosthenes was from Carystus and seems to have helped Athens during the Lamian War. Diod. 18.11.2; *BeLoch. G.G.* 3.1.163.

(28) IG II² No. 469, ca. 306/05.

(29) IG II² No. 448, ca. 318/17: τὴν πόλιν ἐλευθ[ερῶσας φίλην καὶ σύμ]-μαχὸν ἐποίησε τῷ δήμῳ τῶν Ἀθηναίων. Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.44; Diod. 18.11.2; Paus. 1.25.4.

when Demetrius Poliorketes fought Ptolemy I. As a consequence of Demetrius' victory, the Athenians got rid of Demetrius of Phaleron, and in their exuberance they praised Meidias for his contribution toward their external and internal freedom⁽³⁰⁾.

While the above references to freedom deal with a city's freedom, there have been other applications of the term. One of them pertains to the differentiation in status between free men and slaves. Naturally, to be free was a privilege valued highly in the Greek world, but more important still was the duty of the free men to do whatever necessary to defend their freedom. Addressing the Greek mercenary soldiers, Cyrus reminded them that he had brought them hither not because he lacked enough barbarians but because the Greeks were braver and stronger than the barbarians. Cyrus ascribed this superiority to the free life the Greeks lived, for which he considered them happy⁽³¹⁾. Not long afterwards, Xenophon, reiterating the same argument, explained Greek superiority over the barbarians in terms of the freedom of the Greek cities and the free *agōgē* of the Greek citizens⁽³²⁾. Among other benefits, the education of free men provided them with noble pursuits and congenial labor, especially since such occupations attracted and inspired men trained liberally⁽³³⁾. Moreover, men liberally educated are supposedly distinguished mostly by the manner of their speech (Isocr. 4.49); for the ability to speak is the one endowment that singled Man out from all other creatures, and by using this endowment Man had risen above all other creatures in all respects⁽³⁴⁾. When this

(30) IG II² No. 498, ca. 308/02: λέγων καὶ πράττων τὰ ἄριστα διετέλει... τῷ δήμῳ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ὅτε ... Ἀντίγονος ἀπέστειλεν τὸν υἱὸν αὐτοῦ Δημήτριον ἐλευθερώσωντα τ[ὴν] τε πόλιν καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους Ἕλληνας. Similar honors were bestowed on Oxythemides, IG II² No. 558; Arrian *Ind.* 18.7; Athen. 6.253A; 13.578B; 14.614; Diiod. 21.15; 16.5. Also IG II² 559; Plut. *Dem.* 8.

(31) Xen. *Anab.* 1.7.3: ὅπως οὖν ἔσεσθε ἄνδρες ἄξιοι τῆς ἐλευθερίας ἧς κέκτησθε καὶ ἧς ὑμᾶς ἐγὼ εὐδαιμονίζω.

(32) Xen. *Anab.* 3.2.13: μέγιστον δὲ μαρτύριον ἡ ἐλευθερία τῶν πόλεων ἐν αἷς ἐγένεσθε καὶ ἐτράφητε.

(33) Isocr. 7.48: τοὺς ἐλευθέρως τετραμμένους.

(34) Isocr. 2.5-9; 15; 273; Xen. *Mem.* 4.3.

privilege was misused, it brought discredit upon those who did so⁽³⁵⁾. For this right to speak freely and to live as free men the Athenians had chosen for themselves the democratic regime (Isocr. 20.1) and had fought for the restoration of their democracy when it had been twice overthrown by people who had contempt for democratic laws (in 411 and 404). Having championed democracy for themselves, the Athenians had also helped others (the most prominent case was that of the Heraclids) to live in freedom, thereby making manifest that freedom meant the power to refrain from doing anything against one's will⁽³⁶⁾. By extrapolation, the person who sought by intimidation to debar any citizen of his democratic right to equality and free speech was dangerous⁽³⁷⁾. On the other hand, unrestrained freedom was often frowned upon as deleterious, and thus, like us, the Greeks conceived of liberty in a democratic society not as the licence to do as one pleased, irrespective of the effects of one's action upon others, but as a state of self-discipline⁽³⁸⁾.

From this quick survey of the uses of freedom in the fourth century it becomes obvious, I hope, that freedom continued to be the most potent issue in Greek internal and external politics. In a sense, ἔλευθερία continued to preserve its fifth century meaning as freedom from all external and internal compulsion. Because of its deeply emotive quality, freedom was also employed as a propaganda ploy by the fourth century Greeks, exactly as in the previous century. In still another respect, the concept of freedom served to denote the ideal Man to the extent that this ideal Man had been reared in a democracy and had received the proper *agōgē* which enabled him to act freely, behave responsibly,

(35) Aisch. 1.123: οὐκ ἀνδρὸς ἐστὶν ἔλευθέρου, ἀλλὰ πόρνου.

(36) Lys. 2.14: ἡγούμενοι ἔλευθερίας μὲν σημεῖον εἶναι μηδὲν ποιεῖν δίκοντας, which would be a characteristic of a slave. For the use of historical and mythological examples in the fourth century, S. PERLMAN, *Scripta Hierosolymitana*, A. FUKS and I. HALPERN, edd., vol. 7 (1961) 150-166.

(37) Dem. 21.124: ἢ τὰς τῆς ἰσηγορίας καὶ τὰς τῆς ἔλευθερίας ἡμῶν μετουσίαις ἀφαιρεῖσθαι. For a similar idea see Lys. 2.18; Isocr. 12.131.

(38) Isocr. 7.20: οὐδ' ἦ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον ἐπαίδευε τοὺς πολίτας ὥσθ' ἡγεῖσθαι τὴν μὲν ἀκόλασίαν δημοκρατίαν, τὴν δὲ παρανομίαν ἔλευθερίαν.

and be the master of his future. Democratic living thus becomes tantamount to free living within the context of the polis, and Athenian writers like Isocrates and Demosthenes considered the Athenian man as the best example of the free man since it was Athens which, of all the cities of Greece, provided the best conditions for free living. Lastly, in the fourth century ἐλευθερία καὶ αὐτονομία are often juxtaposed, and this juxtaposition is indicative of a trend which eventually would produce a confusion in the meaning of the concept of ἐλευθερία with that of αὐτονομία.

II

Αὐτονομία

It has generally been accepted that Thucydides chose his words very carefully. Thus, although both ἐλευθερία and αὐτονομία figure prominently in his history, Thucydides has been careful to delineate between the meanings of the two words. The use of ἐλευθερία in Thucydides is parallel to the same use by the fourth century writers discussed hitherto. But what about *autonomia*? Are the fourth century authors applying it with the same meaning as those in the fifth century?

In 397 the Ionian cities sent ambassadors to Sparta requesting troops to attack Tissaphernes' home base in Caria in order to force him to leave the Greek cities in Ionia free and independent⁽³⁹⁾. The Spartan commander Dercylidas proposed peace between Sparta and Persia in exchange for the independence of the Greek cities of Ionia. Since Tissaphernes was the overall governor of Asia Minor as well as the most important representative of the King there, the use of the term *autonomia* must imply freedom from the Persian rule, i.e. external as well as internal freedom for the cities of Asia Minor⁽⁴⁰⁾.

When Tissaphernes asked Agesilaus the purpose of his campaign in Asia, Agesilaus replied that his objective was to make

(39) Xen. *Hell.* 3.2.12: ἀφιέναι αὐτονόμους τὰς Ἑλληνίδας πόλεις.

(40) Xen. *Hell.* 3.2.20: εἰ αὐτονόμους ἐώη βασιλεὺς τὰς Ἑλληνίδας πόλεις.

the cities independent like those in Greece⁽⁴¹⁾. Since the Lacedaemonians claimed to have liberated the Greek cities from Athenian tyranny, the term αὐτονόμους here must advert to the external as well as the internal freedom of the Greek cities. Greek cities may complain, as indeed they did, that Sparta interfered with their freedom, but the Spartans did not perceive their role as an interference. The successor of Tissaphernes finally proposed a treaty to Agesilaus (in 395) granting autonomy to the Ionian cities, provided these cities paid the ancient tribute to the King of Persia (the tribute they paid before the organization of the Delian League)⁽⁴²⁾. It is obvious that autonomy at this point refers to the right of self-government subject otherwise to the Persian suzerainty. This interpretation of *autonomia*, though congruent with the fifth century meaning of the term, is different from the use of the meaning suggested above.

At about the time these events were unfolding in Asia Minor, the Spartans encountered all sorts of problems among the cities in Greece because the latter resented Spartan haughtiness. The Eleans, for instance, left the Peloponnesian alliance and joined the opponents of Sparta, Argives, Mantineans, and Athenians. The Lacedaemonians found this secession hard to accept, especially since the Eleans spread the rumor among the Greeks that the Peloponnesian War against Athens had been wrong. The Lacedaemonians demanded that the Eleans leave the surrounding cities of Elis independent, but the Eleans rejected the demand, arguing that these cities were their prize of war⁽⁴³⁾. The reference to the towns as a prize of war indicates that autonomy at this point implies external freedom since there was no question about those towns' internal right to self-government. The Eleans naturally felt free to interfere, if they so wished, with the internal affairs of the cities since the latter were considered prizes of war. According to a later source, the Eleans

(41) Xen. *Hell.* 3.4.5: ὁ δ' εἶπεν αὐτονόμους καὶ τὰς ἐν Ἀσίᾳ πόλεις εἶναι, ὥσπερ καὶ τὰς ἐν τῇ παρ' ἡμῖν Ἑλλάδι.

(42) Xen. *Hell.* 3.4.25: αὐτονόμους οὐσας τὸν ἀρχαῖον δασμὸν αὐτῶ ἀποφέρειν.

(43) Xen. *Hell.* 3.2.23: αὐτονόμους.

answered the Lacedaemonian demand as Pericles had done some time earlier, Λεπρεάτας τε αὐτονόμους ἀφιέναι... ἐπειδὴν τὰς περιοικίδας τῆς Σπάρτης πόλεις ἴδωσιν ἔλευθέρους⁽⁴⁴⁾. The words αὐτονόμους and ἔλευθέρους are interchanged as if they both had the same meaning.

In 395 Lysander marched to Haliartus and attempted to persuade the Haliartians to revolt against Thebes and become independent⁽⁴⁵⁾. Αὐτονόμους γίγνεσθαι denotes the acquisition of independence (external and internal) from Thebes, for apparently up to this point the Haliartians stood in some kind of external dependence on the Thebans even if they enjoyed the right to self-government. A year afterward the Lacedaemonians were defeated in the naval battle of Cnidus. Conon encouraged the cities to believe that they would not be deprived of their independence⁽⁴⁶⁾. One could argue from this statement that autonomy alludes here to the internal conditions of the cities while the direction of their interstate relations would now be in the hands of the Persians. Yet if one is to judge from the subsequent narrative, he is led to the conclusion that the external freedom of the cities is implied in this passage.

Incessant fighting among the Greeks in the post-Peloponnesian War era achieved nothing but the gradual and steady exhaustion of the Greek states. Peace was becoming a common desideratum. The first to realize it were the Spartans. They consequently sent Antalcidas on a peace mission to Tiribazus in Asia Minor⁽⁴⁷⁾. Antalcidas proposed peace on the principle of autonomy, which

(44) Thuc. 1.144.2: καὶ ὅταν κάκεινοι ταῖς ἑαυτῶν ἀποδώσι πόλεσιν αὐτονομεῖσθαι. The difficulty with Pausanias' statement is that he might be using the language of his time, not a fourth century expression, but even so his statement is not different from the use of ἔλευθερία καὶ αὐτονομία in the fourth century, Paus. 3.8.2.

(45) Xen. *Hell.* 3.5.18: ἀφίστασθαι καὶ αὐτονόμους γίγνεσθαι.

(46) Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.1: ἐάσοιέν τε αὐτονόμους.

(47) Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.12-13; U. WILCKEN, *Über Entstehung und Zweck des Königsfriedens*, Abh. Berlin, 1941, No. 15, p. 10; F. HAMPL, *Die Griechische Staatverträge des 4. Jahrhunderts* (Leipzig, 1938) 85; A. HEUSS, *Hermes* 73 (1938) 161; T.T.B. RYDER, *Koine Eirene* (Oxford, 1955) 27-28; H. BENGTSON, *Gr. G.*, 2nd ed. (Munich, 1960) 261; Plat. *Menex.* 245 B-C.

meant that the Greeks in Asia Minor would have to pay tribute to the King and recognize him as their overlord⁽⁴⁸⁾. The Athenians, Argives, and Thebans boycotted Antalcidas' initiative. More specifically, the Thebans feared that they might be forced to leave the Boeotian cities independent⁽⁴⁹⁾. While in this instance the external freedom of the Ionian cities is definitely involved, it is not equally clear whether both the internal and external status of the Boeotian cities is entailed or simply the external.

By 387-86 the reservations of the Greek cities regarding a common peace had been overcome, and the peace that the Spartans had proposed in 392 became now a reality. A treaty was thus concluded bearing the name of Antalcidas and stipulating that the Greek cities should be left independent⁽⁵⁰⁾. On the positive side the treaty reaffirmed the Greek desire for freedom and autonomy; indeed, both concepts were generally accepted from now on as self-evident without the need to define them each time a treaty was concluded. The enshrinement of the principle of *autonomia* in the treaties of the fourth century and in the common parlance heightened the purported respect for the concept and reflected on the power of the small cities to protect themselves, since a party that transgressed the principle would be breaking its oaths. On the negative side the common peace idea consecrated the division of Greece into small political units and made the task of panhellenic union harder, until the advent of Philip. One could argue that the concept of *autonomia* referred to in the treaty adverted to the internal freedom of the cities but not the external inasmuch as Sparta was to become the policeman of Greece safeguarding the application of the treaty with the aid of Persia. When, for example, the Thebans set forth the claim to take the oath in the name of all the

(48) Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.14: τὰς τε νήσους ἀπάσας καὶ τὰς ἄλλας πόλεις ἀρκεῖν σφίσιν αὐτονόμους εἶναι.

(49) Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.15: αὐτονόμους.

(50) R.K. SINCLAIR, *Chiron* 8 (1978) 54; D.G. RICE, *Historia* 23 (1974) 164-82; R. SEAGER, *Athenaeum* 52 (1974) 56-63; P. CLOCHÉ, *Thèbes de Béotie* (Namur, 1952) 112 ff; G.L. CAWKWELL, *CQ* 31 (1981) 69-83.

Boeotians (obviously the Thebans inclined to think that their claim did not conflict with the concept of *autonomia* as the internal freedom of the participant cities), Agesilaus rejected the Theban claim. In the face of opposition, the Thebans agreed to leave the Boeotian cities independent⁽⁵¹⁾. Leaving the cities independent, however, meant that these cities would be completely free from Theban, if not from Spartan, influence. Therefore *autonomia* contains a dual implication here, namely, complete independence vis-à-vis the Thebans but not necessarily so as far as Sparta is concerned.

The Thebans were not the only party who raised objections to the treaty of 387-86. The Corinthians and Argives had worked out a union between their respective states prior to 387 and now refused to withdraw their garrisons from each other's city. Faced with this hurdle, Agesilaus threatened war upon both cities unless they complied with the stipulations of the treaty. The threat proved effective, both deciding to withdraw their mutual garrisons (Xen. *Hell.* 5.1.34). The union of Argos and Corinth was dissolved, and Corinth regained her autonomy; Xenophon's phrasing shows that he adverts to the external as well as internal freedom of the Corinthians⁽⁵²⁾. Again, one might argue at this point that the principle of *autonomia* in connection with the King's Peace presuppose the supervision of Sparta, and that Spartan tutelage leaves no alternative to the rest of the Greek cities but to comply with the treaty. When, therefore, Isocrates refers to the treaty of Antalcidas as a *diktat* and not a treaty among equals, he may be partially right; *diktat* or not, however, the interpretation does not invalidate the twofold meaning of *autonomia*, either with respect to the Thebans or the Corinthians, as freedom from both external and internal coercion.

The twofold meaning of *autonomia* is further illustrated by a host of events that followed the treaty. Speaking in favor of peace at Sparta (in 371), the Athenian delegate Autocles accused the Lacedaemonians of having abused the treaty of Antalcidas.

(51) Xen. *Hell.* 5.1.34: ἠναγκάσθησαν αὐτονόμους ἀφέντες.

(52) Xen. *Hell.* 5.1.34: καὶ αὐτὴ ἀφ' ἑαυτῆς ἢ τῶν Κορινθίων πόλις ἐγένετο, and 5.1.6; 6.3.12.

Whereas, Autocles maintained, the Lacedaemonians claimed that the cities of Greece should be independent, they became the greatest obstacle to peace, inasmuch as their demand that the allies follow the Spartans whenever the latter went to war was contrary to *autonomia* (53). Furthermore, the Spartans made these demands without prior consultations with their allies, with the result that the allies were often compelled to go against their own friends, and this caused deep animosities. The paradox produced by this policy was that it pitted friend against friend and that it contravened the principle of *autonomia* inasmuch as the Spartan establishment of decarchies and triancontarchies in the Greek world (whose purpose was to keep the peace, using force if necessary) gave the impression that the Lacedaemonians took pleasure in setting up tyrannies in violation of the treaty (54). Autocles also pointed out that when the King ordered the cities to be independent (55) the Lacedaemonians stated explicitly that if the Thebans did not allow the Boeotian cities self-rule and the right to live under whatever laws they chose, the Thebans would not be acting in accordance with the instructions of the King (56). Finally, when the Lacedaemonians seized the Cadmea (in 393), they did not even allow the Thebans to be independent (57).

The concept of *autonomia* constitutes the heart of Autocles' argument, but its meaning is interchangeably used for freedom from external coercion as well as for the right to self-government.

(53) Xen. *Hell.* 6.3.7: αὐτονόμους τὰς πόλεις χρὴ εἶναι ... ἐμποδῶν τῇ αὐτονομίᾳ ... καίτοι τί τοῦτο αὐτονομίᾳ προσήκει;

(54) Xen. *Hell.* 6.3.8: ἔτι δὲ πάντων ἐναντιώτατον αὐτονομίᾳ, R. SEALEY, *Historia* 5 (1956) 37; D.J. MOSLEY, "The Athenian Embassy to Sparta in 371 B.C.," *Proc. Camb. Phil. Soc.* N.S. 8 (1962) 3; T.T.B. RYDER, CQ 13 (1963) 237; P. CLOCHÉ, *La Politique étrangère d'Athènes* (Paris, 1934) 84; Plut. *Ages.* 28.1; F. TAEGER, *Der Friede von 362* (Stuttgart, 1930) 27-28; G.E. UNDERHILL, and E.C. MARCHANT, *Xenophon Hellenika* (Oxford, 1906) 239; S. LAUFFER, *Historia* 8 (1959) 321; W. JUDEICH, *Kleinasiatische Studien* (Marburg, 1892) 27, n. 3; CAH 5, 367; J.A.R. MUNRO, CQ 31 (1937) 32-38; LOTZE, *Lysander*, 38-39.

(55) Xen. *Hell.* 6.3.9: αὐτονόμους τὰς πόλεις εἶναι.

(56) Xen. *Hell.* 6.3.9: ἐκάστην τῶν πόλεων ἄρχειν τε ἐαυτῆς.

(57) Xen. *Hell.* 6.3.7: αὐτονόμους εἶναι.

Another Athenian delegate to the above conference, Callistratus, pointed out that by seizing the Cadmea the Lacedaemonians had caused the cities in Boeotia to fall under Theban control, although the opposite was the aim of the Lacedaemonians: the independence of the cities⁽⁵⁸⁾. Here again *αὐτονόμους* takes the meaning of external freedom and the right to self-rule.

Upon hearing the various speakers, the Lacedaemonians voted to accept the peace with the provision that all should withdraw their governors from the cities, disband their armaments both on sea and land, and leave the cities independent⁽⁵⁹⁾. In the event that a city chose to act in violation of this agreement, it was settled that those cities which did not desire to do so were not obligated to assist the injured. This resolution was in response to Autocles' complaint. The Thebans, however, demanded again, as in 386, that they be allowed to sign the treaty on behalf of the Boeotian towns. This was unacceptable to the Lacedaemonians who rejected the idea with the consequent rift between the two which led to the fatal battle of Leuctra. The rift could have been avoided had the Lacedaemonians listened to Prothus' advice⁽⁶⁰⁾. In agreement with Autocles' main argument, Prothus suggested that the Lacedaemonians should first disband the army in accordance with their oaths and should then seek financial contribution from the various cities; if any city did not allow another to be independent, the Lacedaemonians would lead all those who wished to support independence against the culprit city⁽⁶¹⁾. Though Prothus advanced both religious and practical considerations (the favor of the gods for cities respecting oaths and the possibility of readier financial and military support from those cities in agreement with his proposal) the Spartan assembly brushed his proposal aside and directed Cleombrotus not to disband his army, which was already in Phocis, but to lead it at once against the Thebans if the latter

(58) Xen. *Hell.* 6.3.11: ἐσπουδάσατε αὐτονόμους... γενέσθαι.

(59) Xen. *Hell.* 6.3.18: αὐτονόμους ἔδν.

(60) Xen. *Hell.* 6.4.2. No more details are given by Xenophon about him.

(61) Xen. *Hell.* 6.4.2: εἰ μή τις ἐφή αὐτονόμους τὰς πόλεις εἶναι and ὅσοι τῇ αὐτονομίᾳ βούλοιντο βοηθεῖν.

persisted in refusing the independence of the Boeotian cities⁽⁶²⁾. The Thebans not only failed to leave the cities independent but they even refused to disband their army. Consequently, Cleombrotus proceeded against Thebes (Xen. *Hell.* 6.3.19-43). The total effect of Prothus' proposal was undoubtedly intended to slow down the eagerness of Sparta to interfere in the affairs of other cities, as she seems to have been doing before and after the King's treaty, and to show that Sparta only moved against others after she had exhausted all peaceful means. In this context, war would appear as nothing else but a last resort. In the meantime, the smaller cities were allowed sufficient time to determine their position in any given dispute. The rejection of the proposal as nonsensical turned out to be disastrous.

The catastrophe that befell Sparta at Leuctra settled the right of the Thebans to rule Boeotia. This right was henceforth accepted as a given in treaties proposed, as that of the Spartans had been to rule Laconia. It further opened the way for the formation of confederations in Greece⁽⁶³⁾. And it inaugurated the short but important period of the Theban hegemony. Under the leadership of Epameinondas and Pelopidas the Thebans now went on the offensive while several of the Peloponnesian cities used the opportunity to free themselves from Spartan tutelage. Almost immediately after Leuctra, a considerable number of *staseis* broke out in the Peloponnese against Sparta which included the Phigaleians, Sicyonians, Megarians (allies but not in the Peloponnese), Phliasians, Corinthians, Argives, Tegeans, Mantineans. The Mantineans, feeling themselves *entirely independent*, called a meeting which decided the formation of the Mantinean synoecism⁽⁶⁴⁾. The striking feature in the description of Xenophon is the use of παντάπασιν to clarify αὐτόνομοι — the

(62) Xen. *Hell.* 6.4.3: αὐτονόμους ἀφίσαιεν τὰς πόλεις.

(63) The Arcadian League was formed ca. 370; the Thessalian League also at about this time, Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.38; 6.4.16-24; M. Cary, *CQ* 19 (1925) 165.

(64) Isocr. 6.11; 6.64-69; Diod. 5.40.1-5; 5.57.3-59; Xen. *Hell.* 6.5.4-21; A. Fuks, *Ancient Society* 3 (1972) 35; *Id.*, *Ancient Society* 5 (1974) 64; Sparta herself was not spared E. David, *Athenaeum* 58 (1980) 299-308.

absence, that is, of all external coercion. Thus the term *αὐτονομία* becomes equivalent to the meaning of *ἐλευθερία* in the fifth century. The Lacedaemonians were deeply disturbed by the creation of a centralized state in an area traditionally within their sphere of influence and sent Agesilaus, an ancestral friend of the Mantineans (Xen. *Hell.* 5.2.3), to dissuade them from their plans. Although the Mantineans refused to conform to Agesilaus' advice, the Lacedaemonians decided not to pursue the matter inasmuch as any action to foil the Mantinean plans would have contravened the peace treaty which was signed *ἐπ' αὐτονομία τῆς εἰρήνης* (Xen. *Hell.* 6.5.5). Had the Lacedaemonians campaigned against Mantinea, it would have become universally manifest that their alleged pursuit of autonomy, which had led to the Leuctran debacle, was nothing but a hollow slogan. Naturally, one should not discount the possibility that Spartan restraint in Mantinea was due to the shock waves of their recent defeat at Leuctra. The Spartans were not in a psychological or military state to undertake another campaign so soon after Leuctra.

The Thebans stepped in to fill the political vacuum. As the Lacedaemonians had done before, the Thebans now sent Pelopidas to the Persian court (in 367) to solicit Persian help. One of Pelopidas' requests was that the Persians recognize Messene's independence⁽⁶⁵⁾. Messene's independence would bury for ever Sparta's hopes of recovering her leadership position in Greece. Thus, in one blow, the Thebans were hoping to achieve what Brasidas had tried to do to Athens during his campaign in the Chalcidice. Interestingly enough, Pelopidas asked that Messene be autonomous from Lacedaemon, not *ἐλευθέρα*, although external as well as internal freedom is implied by the use of *αὐτονομία*. Had Xenophon omitted the *ἀπὸ Λακεδαιμονίων* someone could have justifiably argued in favor of the view that the autonomy of Messene guaranteed her self-rule, not her external independence. Yet such is not the case here, at least in reference to Sparta. The term *αὐτονομία* is therefore tantamount to *ἐλευθερία* in the fifth century.

(65) Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.39: Μεσσήνην τε αὐτόνομον εἶναι ἀπὸ Λακεδαιμονίων.

Xenophon has been criticized for his lack of depth as well as his lack of objectivity and the omission of what we consider important political events such as the formation of the Second Athenian alliance in 378-77. There is perhaps an indirect reference to this alliance in the description of the events of 371. That year the Athenians, perceiving that the Peloponnesians still depended on Sparta's leadership and wanted to break Sparta's hold upon them, invited all the Peloponnesian cities which wished to uphold the King's peace to a conference in Athens. The participants at this conference swore an oath to abide by the King's treaty and the decrees of the Athenians and their allies. If any city took the field against any other, it would become incumbent upon the rest to assist the victim. The undertaking to go to the help of any city that might be attacked was made obligatory, in contrast to the optional clause at the conference in Sparta in 371. The Eleans opposed this resolution because it implied the independence of the Marganians, Scilluntians, and Triphylians, maintaining that the above territories were theirs⁽⁶⁶⁾. The Athenians and the other participants at the conference considered this claim a contravention to the King's treaty and rejected it. Consequently, the Eleans decided to stay out of this arrangement (Xen. *Hell.* 6.5.3). It is evident from this dispute that the Peloponnesians were internally free but followed Sparta's leadership in their interstate relations (Πελοποννήσιοι ἔτι οἴονται χρῆναι ἀκολουθεῖν). This influence of Sparta did not contravene the Common Peace where the autonomy of the Greek cities was guaranteed. Something parallel must have been true with the Marganians, Scilluntians, and Triphylians. The σφετέρως γὰρ εἶναι ταύτας τὰς πόλεις does not mean that these cities were integrated into Elis; it rather indicates a relationship analogous to the relationship of the other Peloponnesian cities to Sparta. Since the Athenians aimed at making the Peloponnesian cities completely free from Sparta, something kindred was intended for the three cities, but the Eleans balked. The term autonomous must therefore refer to the

(66) Xen. *Hell.* 6.5.2: οὐ δέοι αὐτόνομους ποιεῖν οὔτε Μαργανέας οὔτε Σκιλλουντίους οὔτε Τριφυλλίους.

cities' complete freedom, and as such it corresponds to the position of ἔλευθερία in the fifth century, at least as far as the reciprocal arrangements between the Eleans and the three cities are concerned.

The arrangements of the Second Athenian alliance are contained in the famous decree of Aristotle in 378-77. The aim of the new confederacy was to secure freedom and autonomy from Sparta and the undisturbed possession of property by the participating cities (67). The Athenians disavowed any intention of infringing upon the Peace of Antalcidas; accordingly, Greeks and barbarians subject to the King were excluded. The members of the Second Athenian Confederacy were to enjoy any constitution they pleased without the imposition of garrisons and governors or the payment of tribute. These conditions were analogous to those stipulated already among Athenians, Chians, and Thebans in earlier treaties. Since the avowed purpose of the treaty was to resist Spartan aggression and tyranny and to secure peace and liberty among the members of the treaty, the terms ἔλευθερος and αὐτόνομος both express the status of complete freedom. The juxtaposition of these words in this and other

(67) IG II² No. 43, lines 6-10: ὅπως ἂν Λακεδ[αιμό]νιοι ἐδώσι τὸς Ἑλλήνας ἔλευθέ[ρ]ος καὶ αὐτόνομος, 15-20: ἐὰν τις βόληται τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἢ τῶν βαρβάρων...ἐξεῖναι αὐ[τ]ῷ [ἔλευθέρ]ω ὄντι καὶ αὐτόνομῳ, E. SCHWEIGERT, *Hesperia* 8 (1940); E. EGGER, *Études historiques sur les traités publics*, 2nd ed. (Paris, 1866) 85 ff; BENGTSON, *Staatsverträge*, No. 6. 257; Ditt. *Syll.* I³ 147; G. BUSOLT, *Der zweite athenische Bund*, *Jahrb. für class. Phil.*, Suppl. Bd 7 (1873-75) 739-55; A. SCHAEFER, *Demosthenes und seine Zeit*, I² (1885) 27-35; F.H. MARSHALL, *The Second Athenian Confederacy* passim; and J. CARGILL, *The Second Athenian League* (University of Calif. Press, 1981); G. BUSOLT and H. SWOBODA, *Griechische Staatskunde*, 2 Munich (1926) 1366-76; V. EHRENBERG, *Hermes* 64 (1929) 322; J. HATZFELD, *REA* 36 (1934) 457-63; J. PAPASTAVROU, *Hellenika* 10 (1966) 53; F. HAMPL, *Die griechischen Staatsverträge* (Leipzig 1938) 131 ff; V. MARTIN, *La vie internationale dans la Grèce des cités* (Genève, 1940) 244; S. ACCAME, *La lega ateniese del secolo IV* (Rome, 1941) 9-48; H. TRIEPEL, *Die Hegemonie*, 2nd ed. (Stuttgart, 1943) 388-90; J.A.O. LARSEN, *Representative Government in Greek and Roman History* (Univ. of Calif. Press, 1955) 47-55; A.G. WOODHEAD, *AJA* 61 (1957) 367-73; R. SEALEY, *Phoenix* 11 (1957) 104-09; F. GSCHNITZER, *Gemeinde und Herrschaft*, SB Wien 235,3 (1960) 45-46.

instances in the fourth century suggests the emergence of a widely employed formula which hardly distinguished between the meaning of the two words. The guarantee of freedom and autonomy to the allies by Athens, however, proved rather illusory. Overcome by the *anthropeia physis*, as Thucydides would say, the Athenians repeated the errors they had promised to avoid. Nonetheless, this in no way impinges on the argument regarding the interpretation of the two terms.

The same formulaic expression is to be found in several of the individual alliances between Athens and other cities. For example, in 384-83 the Athenians made an alliance with the Chians for the purpose of safeguarding freedom and autonomy⁽⁶⁸⁾. To avoid the suspicion and hostility of Persia and Sparta the allies were at pains to emphasize that their alliance in no way intended to infringe on the peace of Antalcidas but rather to supplement it (lines 13-14). Ἐλευθερία and αὐτονομία was the formula used to express the intent of the allies. In a similar treaty (in 378-77), the Chalcidians were guaranteed the enjoyment of their liberty and autonomy⁽⁶⁹⁾. Again, the same formula is used without any attempt to differentiate between ἔλευθερία and αὐτονομία.

Of equal interest is an extant portion of an Athenian decree containing a few clauses of an alliance concluded between Athens and the Thracian kings Berisades, Amadocus, and Cresobleptes⁽⁷⁰⁾. It stipulated that if the Thracian cities, registered as

(68) IG II² No. 34, lines 20-21: Σύμμοχος δε ποιείσ[θα]ι [Χί]ος ἐπ' ἔλευθερίᾳ καὶ αὐτονομί[ᾳ]; Tod 2, 118; BENGTSON, *Staatsverträge*, 248; Ditt. *Syll.* I³ 142; BUSOLT, *Der zweite Athen. Bund*, 677-85; A. SCHAEFER, *Demosthenes*, 27; MEYER, *GdA* 5, 308-10; BELOCH, 3.2.1, 149; CLOCHÉ, *La polit. étrangère*, 15; ACCAME, *La lega*, 9.

(69) IG II² No. 44, lines 21-23: ἔχε[ν τή]ν ἐαυτῶν Χαλκιδέ[ας] ἐλευθέρο[ς] ὄντα[ς καὶ] αὐτονόμος, Tod 2, 124; BENGTSON, *Staatsverträge*, 259; MARSHALL, S.A.C., 57.

(70) Dem. 23.173; 18.27; 4.4.8; Aisch. 2.9; 3.61; Diod. 16.43.4; A. HÖCK, *Hermes*, 76-104; BENGTSON, *Staatsverträge*, No. 303; CLOCHÉ, *Revue de Philologie* 46 (1922) 5; G. GLOTZ, *Mélanges*, 1 (Paris, 1932) 215; U. KAHRSTEDT, *Beiträge zur Geschichte der Thrakischer Chersonesos* (Baden-Baden, 1954) 28; GSCHNITZER, *Gemeinde und Herrschaft*, 17-18.

tributaries to Athens in the Chersonese, failed to pay to her the tribute owed, the three kings would levy the tribute to the best of their power (lines 4-9). On the other hand, if any city failed to pay her tribute to one of the kings in question, the Athenians and their magistrates in office would do their utmost to exact it (lines 9-13). However, if the cities in the Chersonese paid the tribute to the Thracian kings and their contribution (σύνταξις) to Athens, they would be free and independent and would remain allies of Athens in accordance with their oaths to Athens and the Thracian kings (lines 13-18). The treaty was signed by Chares who had been sent out as general by the Athenians and in this capacity met with the three kings and their representatives. The characterization of the treaty by Demosthenes as ἄρισται καὶ δικαιοτάται points to the fact that the earlier treaty with the kings was not considered satisfactory to Athens⁽⁷¹⁾. This new treaty seems to have been a compromise between Athens and the kings, based upon mutual recognition and reciprocal services while admitting the equal status of the contracting parties. Confronted with the Social War, Athens was probably delighted to have settled this matter amicably. The payment of the tribute by the cities as a condition for their continuing freedom and independence demonstrates that these concepts carried a different meaning for the Greeks in the fourth century, inasmuch as no city in the fifth century would have considered herself free (ἐλευθέρα) if she had to pay tribute to an outside power. The forceful payment of tribute constitutes an *a fortiori* evidence of the absence of complete freedom among these cities in the Chersonese, and under such circumstances the term ἐλευθερία would not have been used in the fifth century. A simple comparison, for instance, between this treaty and the clauses of the treaty of Nicias where autonomy is used to designate the status of Athenian allies (Thuc. 5.18.5) will make it abundantly clear that the fine distinction between ἐλευθερία and αὐτονομία which existed in the fifth century had disappeared by the fourth century.

(71) Dem. 23.167; 170; Strabo 7 fr. 48; J.W. PARKE, *Greek Mercenary Soldiers* (Oxford, 1933) 125; Dem. 23.171; 183.

III

In sum, the term ἔλευθερία was used in the fifth century to describe the state of freedom from all external coercion, while αὐτονομία denoted some sort of voluntary or involuntary coercion. In the fourth century, the meaning of ἔλευθερία as complete independence from outside coercion continued to survive in several cases, while elsewhere it sustained a radical dilution. Used in conjunction with αὐτονομία (ἔλευθερία and αὐτονομία) it became a fourth century formulaic locution, with the concomitant loss of all distinction between the two terms. In this context, αὐτονομία is used interchangeably with ἔλευθερία whereas ἔλευθερία was sometimes used where αὐτονομία had earlier been employed. Furthermore, there was a distinct popularization of both terms in the fourth century which seems to have been conducive to the diffusion of their meaning.